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Abstract
Traditional methods in public key cryptography are based on number theory, and suffer from
problems such as dealing with very large numbers, making key creation cumbersome. Here, we
propose a new public key cryptosystem based on strings only, which avoids the difficulties of
the traditional number theory approach. The security mechanism for public and secret keys
generation is ensured by a recursive encoding mechanism embedded in a quasi-commutative-
random function, resulted from the composition of a quasi-commutative function with a pseudo-
random function. In this revised version of the paper we show that the eavesdropper’s problem
of the proposed cryptosystem has a solution, and we give the details of the solution.
1 Introduction
In a symmetrical key cryptosystem [1], such as AES (Advanced Encryption Standard), two users
Alice and Bob must first agree on a common secret key. If Alice communicates the secret key to
Bob, a third party, Eve, might intercept the key, and decrypt the messages. In order to avoid such
a situation Alice and Bob can use an asymmetric public key cryptosystem [1], which provides a
secure mechanism to exchange information between two users.
In public key cryptography each user has a pair of cryptographic keys, consisting of a public key
and a secret private key. These keys are related through a hard mathematical inversion problem,
such that the private key cannot be practically derived from the public key.
The two main directions of public key cryptography are the public key encryption and the
digital signatures. Public key encryption is used to ensure confidentiality. In this case, the data
encrypted with the public key can only be decrypted with the corresponding private key, and vice
versa. Digital signatures are used to ensure authenticity. In this case, any message signed with a
user’s private key can be verified by anyone having the user’s public key, proving the authenticity
of the message.
A standard implementation of public key cryptography is based on the Diffie-Hellman (DH) key
agreement protocol [2]. The protocol allows two users to exchange a secret key over an insecure
communication channel. The platform of the DH protocol is the multiplicative group Zp of integers
modulo a prime p. The DH protocol can be described as following:
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1. Alice and Bob agree upon the public integer g ∈ Zp.
2. Alice chooses the secret integer a.
3. Alice computes A = gamod p, and publishes A.
4. Bob chooses the secret integer b,
5. Bob computes B = gbmod p, and publishes B.
6. Alice computes the secret integer KA = B
amod p = gbamod p.
7. Bob computes the secret integer KB = A
bmod p = gabmod p.
It is obvious that both Alice and Bob calculate the same integer K = KA = KB , which then
can be used as a secret shared key for symmetric encryption, improving the performance of the
communication channel, since symmetric-key algorithms are generally much faster.
Assuming that the eavesdropper Eve knows p, g,A and B, she needs to compute the secret key
K, that is to solve the discrete logarithm problem:
A = gamod p, (1)
for the unknown a. If p is a very large prime of at least 300 digits, and a and b are at least 100
digits long, then the problem becomes computationally hard (exponential time in log p), and it is
considered infeasible. For maximum security p should be a safeprime, i.e. (p− 1)/2 is also a prime,
and g a primitive root of p [3].
An important short coming of traditional public key cryptosystems is the computation with very
large numbers and prime numbers (300 digit), which is difficult and not very efficient. For similar
key sizes, the DH method has a similar key strength as the mathematically related RSA method [4],
which is based on the hard integer factorization problem. Currently, no classical algorithm that can
factor large numbers efficiently is known, which makes the RSA and the DH methods, widely used
cryptographic protocols. However, this problem can be solved on a quantum computer in polynomial
time using Shor’s algorithm [5]. Therefore, the current public key cryptographic protocols are
insecure if sufficiently large quantum computers become available, putting many sensitive systems
like e-commerce and Internet banking at risk. This is why there is an ongoing search for other
methods, where similar key exchange mechanisms can be implemented more efficiently, and are
immune to quantum algorithms attacks.
Here, we propose a new public key cryptosystem based on strings only, which avoids the tradi-
tional number theory approach. The security of the proposed cryptosystem is ensured by a recursive
encoding mechanism embedded in a quasi-commutative-random function, which is a composition of
a quasi-commutative function with a pseudo-random function. Also, in this revised version of the
paper we show that the eavesdropper’s problem of the proposed cryptosystem has a solution based
on the modular multiplicative inverse, and we give the details of the solution.
2 Quasi-commutative transformation
Let us consider the following set:
Ω = {0, 1, 2, ..., p − 1|p = 2n, n > 1}, (2)
where the total number of elements is even. For example, if the intention is to build a crytosystem
based on strings where the characters α ∈ Ω are representable on a byte word (8 bits), then one
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can consider p = 28 = 256. However, we should emphasize that this choice is not a restriction, and
the results obtained here are valid for any even integer p = 2n. Thus, we assume that any element:
s = {s0, s1, ..., sN−1} ∈ Ω
N (3)
is a string of length N defined over the set Ω.
A function F : Ω× Ω→ Ω is said to be quasi-commutative if for any ξ, α, β ∈ Ω we have [6]:
F (F (ξ, α), β) = F (F (ξ, β), α). (4)
For example, the function used in both DH and RSA algorithms:
Fp(ξ, α) = ξ
αmod p, (5)
is quasi-commutative, because:
Fp(Fp(ξ, α), β) = ξ
αβ mod p = Fp(Fp(ξ, β), α). (6)
Here we consider the function Gw : Ω× Ω→ Ω defined as:
Gw(ξ, α) = [(wα + 1)ξ + α]mod p, w ∈ N. (7)
The function Gw is quasi-commutative, since we have:
Gw(Gw(ξ, α), β) = (wβ + 1)[(wα + 1)ξ + α] + β =
= (wα+ 1)(wβ + 1)ξ + α(wβ + 1) + β =
= (wα+ 1)(wβ + 1)ξ + β(wα + 1) + α =
= (wα + 1)[(wβ + 1)ξ + β] + α = Gw(Gw(ξ, β), α), (8)
where we have omitted mod p, in order to simplify the notation.
The quasi-commutative property ensures that if one starts with an initial value ξ ∈ Ω and a set
of values {α0, α1, ..., αN−1} ∈ Ω
N , then the result of the composition:
r = Gw(...(Gw(Gw(ξ, α0), α1), ..., αN−1) (9)
would not change if the order of the values αn were permuted [6].
We should note that if the parameter w is even, w = 2q, q ∈ N, then the function Gw does not
have fixed points. In order to prove this, let us consider the fixed point equation:
Gw(ξ, α) = [(wα + 1)ξ + α]mod p = ξ, (10)
which is equivalent to
(wα + 1)ξ + α = ξ + αmp, (11)
and
wξ = mp− 1. (12)
Since mp − 1 is odd, w must be also odd in order to have a solution of the above equation. For
example, if w = 1 then ξ = (mp − 1)mod p = p − 1 is a solution of the fixed point equation.
Similarly, if w = 3, then ξ = p − 3 is a solution of the fixed point equation. However, if w is even,
then the fixed point equation has no integer solutions. Thus, the parameter w in the function Gw
must be even, w = 2q, q ∈ N, in order to avoid a fixed point in repeated iterations.
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3 Pseudo-random transformation
Let us now consider the following problem. Given a string “seed”:
s(0) = {s
(0)
0 , s
(0)
1 , ..., s
(0)
N−1} ∈ Ω
N , (13)
find a transformation R, that generates a non-repeating and pseudo-random sequence of strings,
through a recursive application:
s(t+1) = R(s(t)) = ... = R(t+1)(s(0)) = R(R(...R(s(0))))︸ ︷︷ ︸
t+1
. (14)
The transformation R can be for example a cryptographic hash function, which is considered
impossible to invert, a random number generator, or a chaotic deterministic function. Here we prefer
to use a secure cryptographic hash function, due to its ability to deal directly with input strings of
any length. However, following a similar approach, one can also adapt a cryptographically secure
random number generator (for example AES), or a chaotic deterministic function.
An ideal cryptographic hash function has the following properties: (a) it computes a hash value
for any given string; (b) it is impossible to invert, i.e. to generate a string that has a given hash;
(c) any change in the input string triggers a change in the hash value; (d) it is impossible to find
two different strings with the same hash value. Therefore, a cryptographic hash function should
provide a random transformation of the input string. Typical hash functions that can be used for
the role of the R transformation are the standard SHA-1, SHA-2 and SHA-3 cryptographic hash
functions, published by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) as a U.S. Federal
Information Processing Standard (FIPS).
Most cryptographic hash functions are designed to take a string of any length as input and
produce a fixed-length hash string value. Here, we assume that the computed output hash string
has a fixed length L > 0, such that:
R : ΩN → ΩL, ∀N ≥ 0. (15)
4 The proposed cryptosystem
For any element ξ ∈ Ω and string s = {s0, s1, ..., sN−1} ∈ Ω
N we define the following recursive
transformation:
T : ΩN+1 → Ω, (16)
where
T (ξ, s) = Gw(...(Gw(Gw(ξ, s0), s1), ..., sN ). (17)
According to the results from the previous sections, this transformation satisfies the quasi-commutative
property. Also, we should note that from the algorithmic point of view, the transformation T can
be calculated as following:
T (ξ, s) =


ξ˜ ← ξ
for n = 0...N − 1
ξ˜ ← Gw(ξ˜, sn)
return ξ˜
. (18)
Let us now define a more complex transformation W , as a composition of T and R. For any
two strings x = {x0, x1, ..., xK−1} ∈ Ω
K and s = {s0, s1, ..., sN−1} ∈ Ω
N we define:
W : ΩK+N → ΩK , (19)
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with the components Wk, k = 0, 1, ...,K − 1, given by:
Wk = T (xk, R
(k+1)(s)), (20)
satisfying the quasi-commutative property, since T is quasi-commutative. The whole transformation
is also quasi-commutative, and algorithmically it can be computed as following:
W (x, s) =


s˜← R(s)
x˜0 ← T (x0, s˜)
for k = 1...K − 1
s˜← R(s˜)
x˜k ← T (xk, s˜)
return x˜
. (21)
An important aspect of the W function, is that each component xk of the input string x is encoded
using a different string s˜ obtained by recursively applying the pseudo-random cryptographic hash
function R to the secret string s.
Since now all the necessary ingredients have been defined, the proposed key generation and
exchange protocol can be formulated as following:
1. Alice and Bob agree upon the public string g = {g0, g1, ..., gK−1} ∈ Ω
K .
2. Alice chooses the secret string a = {a0, a1, ..., aN} ∈ Ω
N .
3. Alice computes the string A = W (g, a) ∈ ΩK , and publishes A.
4. Bob chooses the secret string b = {b0, b1, ..., bM} ∈ Ω
M .
5. Bob computes the string B = W (g, b) ∈ ΩK , and publishes B.
6. Alice calculates the secret string sA = W (B, a) = W (W (g, b), a) ∈ Ω
K .
7. Bob calculates the secret string sB = W (A, b) = W (W (g, a), b) ∈ Ω
K .
Both Alice and Bob obtain the same secret key s = sA = sB, since W satisfies the quasi-
commutativity property:
W (W (g, b), a) = W (W (g, a), b). (22)
The flow chart showing the above key generation and exchange protocol is given in Figure 1. Also,
the C code implementing the proposed key generation and exchange protocol, and a typical key
exchange simulation example, are given in the Appendix.
5 The hard problem
Assuming that the eavesdropper Eve knows g,A and B the hard problem is to compute the strings
a ∈ ΩN and respectively b ∈ ΩM . This is a hard problem, since even the length (N and M) of
the strings is kept secret by Alice and Bob, and the security is ensured by the above described
recursive encoding mechanism embedded in the quasi-commutative-random function W , which is a
composition of a quasi-commutative function T with a pseudo-random function R.
The encoding mechanism can also be described with the following recursive equations for the
evolution of a and Ak, k = 0, 1, ...,K − 1:
a(k) = R(k+1)(a) = R(R(...R(a)))︸ ︷︷ ︸
k+1
, (23)
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and respectively
Ak = [gk
L−1∏
n=0
(wa(k)n + 1) +
L−2∑
i=0
a
(k)
i
L−1∏
n=i+1
(wa(k)n + 1) + a
(k)
Nk−1
]mod p, (24)
with the unknowns a
(k)
0 , a
(k)
1 , ..., a
(k)
L−1. We should note that for each k = 0, 1, ...,K − 1, any per-
mutation a˜(k) of a(k) is also a solution of the equation (24). Assuming that by chance Eve finds a
solution a˜(0) for the first equation, k = 0, which is in fact a permutation of a hash of a, then one may
think that she may use the recursion equation (23) to find a˜(k). This is not possible either, because
the results a˜(k) obtained via R(k+1) are completely dependent on the order of the characters in the
string a˜(0). Therefore, any permutation a˜(0) of a(0) will give a different result a˜(k). The recursion
R(k+1) gives the correct result if and only if a˜(0) ≡ a(0).
6 Solution of the eavesdropper’s problem
We assume that Eve knows the public information A and B, and we show that she can use this
information to find the shared secret key s ≡ sA = sB. Since A = W (g, a) ∈ Ω
K , for k =
0, 1, ...,K − 1 we consider:
Ak = [(wgk + 1)ek + gk]mod p (25)
where the quantity e = {e0, e1, ..., eK−1} will act as Alice’s private key a. From here we obtain:
Ak − gk = (wgk + 1)ek mod p, (26)
ek = (wgk + 1)
−1(Ak − gk)mod p, (27)
The calculation of the modular inverse is shown in the program from the Appendix. We also have
s = W (B, a) ∈ ΩK , and by replacing a with e we obtain the shared secret key:
sk = [(wBk + 1)ek +Bk]mod p, k = 0, 1, ...,K − 1. (28)
7 Conclusion
In conclusion, we have presented a new public key cryptosystem based on strings, which avoids the
cumbersome key generation using the traditional number theory approach. The security mechanism
for public and secret keys generation is ensured by a recursive encoding mechanism embedded
in a quasi-commutative-random function, resulted from the composition of a quasi-commutative
function with a pseudo-random function. Also, In this revised version of the paper we have shown
that the Eavesdropper’s problem of the proposed cryptosystem has a solution based on the modular
multiplicative inverse, and we have given the details of the solution.
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Appendix
Below we give the C code of the proposed cryptosystem and the solution of the eavesdropper’s
problem.
//keys.c, C implementation of the key exchange protocol
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <openssl/sha.h>
unsigned char *W(unsigned char *x, unsigned K,
unsigned char *s, unsigned N){
unsigned k, n, w = 2;
unsigned char *y = malloc(K);
unsigned char *z = SHA512(s, N, 0);
y[0] = x[0];
for(n=0; n<SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH; n++){
y[0] = (w*z[n] + 1)*y[0] + z[n];
}
for(k=1; k<K; k++){
z = SHA512(z, SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH , 0);
y[k] = x[k];
for(n=0; n< SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH; n++){
y[k] = (w*z[n] + 1)*y[k] + z[n];
}
}
return y;
}
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Figure 1: The flow chart of the key generation and exchange protocol.
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void sprint(unsigned char *x, unsigned N){
unsigned n;
for(n=0; n<N; n++){
if(n % 32 == 0) printf ("\n");
else printf ("%02x", x[n]);
}
printf ("\n");
}
/*****************************************************/
/* Code added to solve Eve ’s problem. */
unsigned char inverseMod256(unsigned char x){
static int initialized=0;
static unsigned inv[256];
unsigned int i, j;
if (!(initialized)){
/* Build a table of inverses. */
for(i=0; i<256; i++) inv[i] = 0;
for(i=0; i<256; i++){
for(j=0; j <256; j++){
if((i*j)%256 == 1){
inv[i] = (unsigned char)j;
inv[j] = (unsigned char)i;
}
}
}
initialized=1;
}
return inv[x];
}
void Eve(unsigned char *g, unsigned char *A,
unsigned char *B, unsigned K, unsigned w){
unsigned char *e = malloc(K), *Se = malloc(K);
int j;
for(j=0; j<K; j++){
e[j] = (A[j] - g[j])*inverseMod256(w*g[j] + 1);
}
/* e[0] ,... ,e[K-1] acts like Alice ’s private key.
Now find the shared secret key. */
for(j=0; j<K; j++){
Se[j] = w*B[j]*e[j] + B[j] + e[j];
}
printf ("\n\nEve has recovered the shared secret key:\n");
sprint(Se , K);
}
/*****************************************************/
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main(int argc , char *argv[]){
unsigned N = 253, M = 121, K = 127;
unsigned n, m, k;
srand((unsigned char) time(0) + getpid ());
unsigned char *g = malloc(K);
for(k=0; k<K; k++) g[k] = rand() % 256;
printf ("\nGenerator: public g"); sprint(g, K);
unsigned char *a = malloc(N);
for(n=0; n<N; n++) a[n] = rand() % 256;
printf ("\nAlice: secret key a"); sprint(a, N);
unsigned char *b = malloc(M);
for(m=0; m<M; m++) b[m] = rand() % 256;
printf ("\nBob: secret key b"); sprint(b, M);
unsigned char *A = W(g, K, a, N);
printf ("\nAlice: public key A"); sprint(A, K);
unsigned char *B = W(g, K, b, M);
printf ("\nBob: public key B"); sprint(B, K);
unsigned char *Sa = W(B, K, a, N);
printf ("\nAlice: shared secret key s = Sa"); sprint(Sa , K);
unsigned char *Sb = W(A, K, b, M);
printf ("\nBob: shared secret key s = Sb"); sprint(Sb, K);
/* Now , Eve can use the public information A and B
to find the shared secret key. */
Eve(g, A, B, K, 2);
free(a); free(b); free(g); free(A);
free(B); free(Sa); free(Sb);
return 0;
}
The code example (keys.c) has been tested on a LINUX PC, running Ubuntu 14.04 LTS, using
the standard GCC compiler and OpenSSL implementation of the Secure Socket Layer (SSL), and
related cryptographic tools. In this example, the role of the secure cryptographic hash function R
is taken by the SHA-2 function which provides hash strings with a length of 64 bytes (512 bits),
and we set p = 256.
The required compilation and run steps are:
gcc − l s s l −l c r yp t o keys . c −o keys
. / keys
For illustration purposes, the results obtained for one instance run are given below in hexadeci-
mal. One can see that both Alice and Bob compute the same secret key (Sa = Sb), using completely
different secret and public keys. One can can also see that Eve can recover the secret key using the
public information A and B.
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Simulation results:
Generator: public g
93444 ff1380add6ae67dba5444e16cffa02679ba50e6c66cf72b18c7cf53d3
972253 d02c303a12aef467f2d6d3f276f96b304951f6b64922ce10f121e353
06 a68932d6c34584b8ac778e7f690478d434c2252a786e4c467e3d67629020
36 a99a0d6ddf91258b08b30a71b78345eb456b15bdd96203589f6aba308b
Alice: secret key a
6634 bc73a19c05c6270d79327f30b5c41bfa2f31b70993ba6132241b62af3d
e4f93c8595414cbd4fc5efcef6a492119ec24255cbd50f2c0833476ae38433
7 d704c13b198d0005ebfce546361650123a856ee7d651a859861f07be52342
938f7545274545850414d967753f6898e7be866423a0eabc01da37e6fd7a48
09 bed630031bb6082f8f6fa4ced83cb596c21aba62047663dead49db27926c
504261535e175b8da6cb3275a36e2a393144f3934869f7261740023ed26e6f
b1d0760fe7d19c8d9cce023f3d2d796e716c01bad6f8e0ed39e22b0b519a2e
6 aa4115175addf127ce151b90eca278037283a0d211afa5afd25654e
Bob: secret key b
93502 a37617cad0e5bbf8a3c10434bdb6acb1293051fb41f190e1c3e736afe
ba293e1ba5eb2a00aab43cbbf887966252a8f557c7a977e0b7931e2bfe1d32
4670 d4eb5cfeeb06b227c1aaaf570d01ff0259c6acd0a66363c58e61e2c01a
31 ee138decfe939e255549d4ac56d6ac582f7204ff196862
Alice: public key A
5 e47a84e9c3934d60b9c86eac559446036b4c3922eb5d69f6214d0ed571399
55 e5f2a66019720222fd1c280a811f54fceca2c1f66d532cd35c0ed5a01c0f
0 f7626a0f3981a163a79ed4caf92e2e992121a4ef84708f4a510555a140f5f
48 f78dae89da8100ccb46a4140ceb1fd03cf382d99532c233a060c065985
Bob: public key B
64 f5bad9a33bc6fb07cf101e6ec86507d607daa28dec4878c47573d23b9bb4
76 d04a6a0c37b400ab8f364b048b8fad94723ed81a0437c3fcc3373842e93d
d0ad6743cce4138fcd7afe363ead967c6696b979dea48a65aa5a04d47d0133
1761 eda41e9eeb6f45196e74d37bccc7c3b127898047dcf1440f3527e7f5
Alice: shared secret key s = Sa
c96eed661ff0575fdec2acaca370ed58b4a1c0fab73f98b3b1cafb74035b8e
7097 c7b8409ecc30078e551da81906ffed952800dd0fb65a918d19442b16c9
dd5d081d15ffcc4de31340d4ceeeecf51caca15a9c1b945d219c0c794bde4c
dd0f6aefe28f1b9e321dbb07f6dade1f5b8b9ce154898e91d656134b6e27
Bob: shared secret key s = Sb
c96eed661ff0575fdec2acaca370ed58b4a1c0fab73f98b3b1cafb74035b8e
7097 c7b8409ecc30078e551da81906ffed952800dd0fb65a918d19442b16c9
dd5d081d15ffcc4de31340d4ceeeecf51caca15a9c1b945d219c0c794bde4c
dd0f6aefe28f1b9e321dbb07f6dade1f5b8b9ce154898e91d656134b6e27
Eve has recovered the shared secret key:
c96eed661ff0575fdec2acaca370ed58b4a1c0fab73f98b3b1cafb74035b8e
7097 c7b8409ecc30078e551da81906ffed952800dd0fb65a918d19442b16c9
dd5d081d15ffcc4de31340d4ceeeecf51caca15a9c1b945d219c0c794bde4c
dd0f6aefe28f1b9e321dbb07f6dade1f5b8b9ce154898e91d656134b6e27
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